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This study explores the evolution of the Green Grants program, run by Brazil´s Ministry 
of Environment, as a means for developing the concept of bureaucratic activism. When 
the Workers´ Party first took office in 2003, many social movement actors joined the 
government, especially in that agency. After 2007, however, most of these activists left 
the government. At the same time, the Ministry substituted thousands of temporary 
employees for permanent civil servants. Surprisingly, the study found that these public 
employees carried forward the environmentalist cause, even when this required 
contesting the priorities of superiors. Examining their attitudes and practices leads to a 
definition of activism as the proactive pursuit of opportunities to defend contentious 
causes. The case study serves to help develop this concept, and to demonstrate that 
workers inside bureaucracies can engage in activist behavior. The study also explores the 
effects of bureaucratic activism on environmental policy-making in Brazil.  
 
  
                                                           
1 A revised version of this paper will be published in Latin American Politics and Society, May 2019, as 
part of a special issue on Brazil.  
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Much of the research on the Workers Party (PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores) 
administrations that ran Brazil under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003 to 2010) and Dilma 
Rousseff (2011 to 2016), emphasized a new proximity between social movements and the 
federal government that the PT made possible. Indeed, during Lula’s first administration, 
relations between the government and some movements were close, especially in social 
and environmental policy areas, and many movement activists took on government jobs. 
Yet over time, a distancing between the PT government and many movements occurred, 
as for the sake of governability, Lula enacted policies and allied with interests that the 
movements criticized. Rousseff had a more ‘technocratic’ administrative style and an 
even more fragile coalition, accentuating the distancing from social movements. This 
article explores how despite this process, a group of public employees with few 
movement ties acted like activists, pursuing social movement causes in ways that 
significantly affected policy design. 
This study focusses on the Green Grants Program created in 2011 and coordinated 
by the Ministry of Environment (henceforth MMA, for Ministério do Meio Ambiente), 
with the participation of several other agencies. The program provides funding for 
impoverished rural families whose economic activities are compatible with forest 
conservation. It was designed as the MMA´s contribution to Rousseff´s broader anti-
poverty campaign. Looking at this policy is particularly interesting because 
environmentalists had ambiguous feelings about it. The program targeted one of the 
green movement’s historic constituencies – traditional forest communities. Its main 
priority, however, was to include more people on the rolls of the government’s highly 
popular cash transfer program. Protecting the environment was secondary, more of a 
hoped-for side effect than a central purpose. By looking at how MMA staff dealt with this 
problem, the article explores the tension between bureaucratic professionalism and 
activist agendas in the Rousseff administration, in the effort to develop a theoretical 
conception of activism inside the bureaucracy.  
Between 2013 and 2015, I conducted 27 interviews with key informants involved 
in national environmental policy in Brazil. Seven of these were conducted in 2013, with 
people who closely followed MMA politics. These preliminary interviews led me to 
identify the Green Grants program for case study. Between 2014 and 2015, I conducted 
20 interviews with public employees responsible for designing and coordinating its 
implementation. Interviewees included employees at the MMA and four other agencies 
directly involved in program implementation. Almost all were permanent bureaucrats.1 
The research began with the expectation that this professionalized bureaucracy 
without clear ties to social movements would depoliticize ministry activities.  During the 
first PT administration, a number of environmentalists took temporary jobs in the MMA 
and pushed hard for their agenda. Most had left the administration by the time Dilma 
Rousseff took office (Abers and Oliveira, 2015). I found, however, that permanent 
ministry employees had become points of resistance against the effort to put the Ministry 
in line with the presidential agenda of expanding anti-poverty programs. While their 
superiors prioritized the quantitative expansion of cash transfers to individual families, 
they sought to transform program design in ways that promoted the empowerment of 
traditional communities for the sake of forest protection. In this article, I argue that the 
attitudes and behaviors of public employees studied confounded conventional 
expectations about how bureaucrats should act. Neither rule followers, a-political 
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technocrats, nor selfish individualists, these actors pursued environmentalist agendas. 
They were activists.  
Studying how professional bureaucrats defend movement ideologies in the 
Ministry of Environment provides the opportunity both to explore how the combination 
of activism and professionalization in the Brazilian federal government affects the 
decision-making processes, and to develop a more general theoretical understanding of 
activism inside public bureaucracies. I build on the work of other scholars who have 
looked at “activist bureaucrats” (Rich, 2013), “inside” or “insider” bureaucrats (Olson, 
2009; Banaszak, 2010;), and “institutional activists” (Pettinicchio, 2012). I argue that 
bureaucrats can be activists in the absence of movement ties. While most definitions of 
activism emphasize the kind of “cause” actors defend, my case study analysis suggests a 
definition that also focusses on a particular, more proactive kind of action. In the pages 
below, I define activism as the pursuit of opportunities to defend contentious causes and 
locate this concept in the literature on bureaucracy. I then show how this concept helps us 
understand how certain bureaucrats perceived their roles and responsibilities and 
identified strategies to influence policy-making in the Green Grants program. In this 
sense, the purpose of this article is to propose a broader understanding of the concept of 
activism, to demonstrate that activism can occur inside bureaucracy, and to explore its 
impacts on policy making.  
 
Bureaucratic Motivations and the Concept of Activism 
In his classic 1940 article, Robert Merton (1952 [1940]) declared that bureaucrats 
inevitably develop dysfunctional personalities. The constant pressure to be “methodical, 
prudent, disciplined" (365), produces “timidity, conservativism, and technicism” (367). 
Following Merton, many theorists presumed that bureaucrats were essentially rule 
followers, whose main problem involved dealing with uncertainty about which rules to 
apply (Turner; 1952; Crozier; 1969). In contrast, the rational actor school proposed that 
bureaucrats are not obsessed with the rules: they think only of themselves. This 
presumption is the basis of the vast literature on the principal-agent problem in public 
bureaucracies (Waterman and Meier, 1998). Here, bureaucrats are utility maximizers who 
seek higher salaries for as little effort as possible. The principal-agent literature focuses 
largely on how to build incentives and sanctions into contracts so that bureaucrats can be 
pressured and coerced into doing what politicians want (Lane, 2005: 33; Dilulio, 1994). 
A third tradition suggests more complex (and less predictable) motivations that fit 
better with the notion of bureaucratic activism. A diversity of scholars argue that 
bureaucrats can be moved by values, ideologies or political projects, not just rules and 
incentives. Some policy theories place bureaucrats into networks bound by shared policy 
ideals or beliefs (Haas, 1992; Sabatier, 1988). Studies of lower level bureaucrats suggest 
that they not only respond to sanctions and incentives affecting their self-interest but also 
act on beliefs. These may be moral beliefs (Lipsky, 1969; Maynard-Moody and 
Musheno, 2003), professional norms (Tummers, 2011; and et al, 2012) or social, racial or 
gender sympathies or prejudices (Kennedy, 2014; Meier 1975; Meier, O´Toole, 2006). 
Career motivation studies find public employees to be less concerned with salary than 
with “intrinsic” rewards (such as the inherent value of their work) than are private sector 
workers (Lee and Wiljins, 2011: 46).  
Studies on the origins of such bureaucratic values tend to provide either 
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dispositional or institutional explanations (Oberfield, 2014). Dispositional approaches 
refer to the values that public employees bring with them into public service – themselves 
a result of social experiences and upbringing. The representative bureaucracy approach, 
for example, argues that the social, racial or gender background of a public employee 
affects his or her behavior in the workplace, especially in the treatment of beneficiaries 
(Kennedy, 2014; Meier 1975; Meier, O´Toole, 2006). Such values may lead to a “self-
selection” process through which people with certain ideas or norms apply for jobs in 
certain bureaucracies. Others studies emphasize that organizational cultures socialize 
bureaucrats to certain norms after they join public service (DiLilio, 1994). Kaufman´s 
classic (1960) study about forest rangers in the U.S. finds that both factors were at work. 
People with certain values tended to apply to the job, but strong cultural forces within the 
organization disseminated particular norms and ideas among them. Oberfeld´s (2014) 
more recent work on police and welfare workers comes to similar conclusions.   
I propose that activism inside the bureaucracy is a subset of the kind of value-
driven behavior these studies have long identified. A small literature on activism inside 
institutions has come out of both the social movement and the policy literatures. From the 
latter, Olsson (2009) and Olsson and Hysing (2012) develop the term “inside activist,” 
defined as  
an individual who is engaged in civil society networks and organizations, who 
holds a formal position within public administration, and who acts strategically 
from inside public administration to change government policy and action in line 
with a personal value commitment. (Olsson and Hysing, 2012: 258).  
This definition focuses on the value-based character of activism, but seems to 
presume that inside activists participate in civil society networks. Other scholars reject 
this presumption. Banaszak´s (2010) studies feminist bureaucrats to deconstruct the 
social movement literature’s presumption that institutionalization results in moderation 
and demobilization. She finds instead that many women inside the U.S. federal 
bureaucracy became feminists (or radicalized in their ideas) only after taking government 
jobs. Pettinichio (2012) defines “institutional activists” as government insiders who 
“proactively work on issues that overlap with social movements,” even if movements 
themselves are not currently mobilized around those issues. He thus also suggests that 
institutional activists do not necessarily participate in social movement organizations.  
In her extensive review of the broader concept of activism, Joyce (2014) notes 
that scholars rarely define the term itself. They tend to focus on compound terms, such as 
women´s activism, environmental activism, and internet activism, thus defining activism 
in terms of the types of participant, cause, or tactics and tools used, rather than as a type 
of action. The only consensus, she argues, is that activism involves work in favor of or 
against changes in the status quo. 
Based on these debates, I propose a two-dimensional concept of activism, one 
which could apply to actors, whether or not they are directly involved in social 
movements. First, activism involves the defense of a particular kind of idea, one that, 
from the perspective of believers, needs to be defended against powerful forces of either 
stability or change. Such ideas can be called causes. Being a cause is not an inherent 
quality of the idea itself, but rather an interpretation produced by actors who believe their 
ideas to be under threat or in need of defense. Causes are by definition contentious, since 
 5 
 
they are only causes to the extent that there is opposition to them. Activism is thus 
inherently contentious, even if it does not always involve contentious practices.  
Although activists may not participate directly in social movement networks or 
organizations, their commitments to causes should not be understood as simply individual 
preferences: they develop out of the same kinds of dispositional, relational and 
institutional processes that affect values more broadly. Melucci (1996) argues that 
commitments grow out of the experiences people have as they engage in social networks. 
Filieule (2010) similarly proposes that “militant engagement” evolves from a 
combination of personal life trajectories, socialization in the organizations to which 
activists belong, and broader based social values.2 Commitment to causes should be 
understood as a social process and activist ideas are developed at least partially through 
the organizations in which activists participate – even if these are public bureaucracies.  
A second dimension of activism is rarely mentioned in the literature. As a 
common-sense term, the word evokes a particularly “active” or “proactive” type of 
action. To explore this idea, we call on the work of action theorists propose going beyond 
the presumption that individuals are either cultural rule-followers or individualist 
calculators (Sewell, 1992; Joas, 1998; Emirbayer and Mische, 1999). Agency is seen by 
these authors as neither the preordained result of socialization and identity, nor somehow 
breaking with cultural or structural constraints. To the contrary, it is always situated in 
structures, which serve as the raw material for action (Sewell, 1992; Joas, 1998). 
Emirbayer and Mishe (1998) propose a three-dimensional conception of agency, with a 
rule-following component, a deliberative-evaluative component and a projective-
purposive component. The latter, in which actors consciously strive towards a project 
they have defined for the future, suggests a more proactive kind of action.  
Not all action involves proactively working towards a conception of the future. At 
the same time, not all proactive action is activist. The rational choice idea that individuals 
are “maximizers” of their self-interest also has a proactive implication. Individuals in the 
classic “homo-economicus” model are not only selfish, but driven to pursue their self-
interest at all costs. This “driven” aspect is present in the idea of activism. The drive, 
however, is not toward the defense of selfish personal interests, but rather toward the 
defense of causes. Activism thus involves the “pursuit” of causes, or what we might think 
of as the pursuit of opportunities to defend a cause.  
My reference to pursuing opportunities harks back to long debates in the social 
movement literature on the notion of how opportunities affect movements. In the classic 
formulation, political changes external to movements influence mobilization (Tilly, 1978; 
Tarrow, 1995, 1996). Some authors argue that this notion is too deterministic (Goodin 
and Jasper 1999; Amenta, 2012). For this reason, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) 
proposed focusing less on opportunities themselves, and more on how social movement 
actors recognize and take advantage of them. Honing in on more micro processes, the 
notion of activism suggests a kind of action that involves not just recognizing, but also 
seeking out opportunities. Activists move to new projects and new organizations, if the 
old ones fail to provide opportunities for promoting the cause they care about.  
The suggestion that activists are people who do not stay put is evoked in recent 
research on the Brazilian bureaucracy that has examined the migration of social 
movement activists into government jobs. This emphasis results from scholarship about 
the Workers´ Party government, where such migration was fairly common in the early 
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years (D´Araújo, 2007). A substantial number of studies look at how people with social 
movement origins influenced policies (Abers, Serafim and Tatagiba, 2014; Abers and 
Tatagiba, 2015; Abers and Oliveira, 2015; Cayres, 2015; Dagnino, Olvera and Panfichi, 
2006; Feltran, 2006; Gutiérres, 2015; Rich, 2013; Serafim, 2013; Silva and de Lima 
Oliveira, 2011).3 
The public employees studied here are similarly engaged in social movement 
causes, but many of them have no actual connection to movements outside the state. 
Rather than presume that activists are people with social movement ties, as does much of 
the literature, this study will show that environmentalists inside the Brazilian government 
behaved like activists in the two senses just discussed: their action was proactive, 
involving a pursuit of opportunities; and the object of that action was the defense of a 
contentious cause – what is known as “socio-environmentalism” -- even when this 
opposed the demands of their superiors. The remainder of this article will demonstrate 
how the conceptual framework proposed can guide us in empirical research on 
bureaucratic actors. First, I will examine the ideas that the bureaucrats interviewed 
expressed about the Green Grants policy, showing them to qualify as “causes.” Second, I 
will explore how they acted in defense of those ideas, by proactively seeking creative 
ways to take advantage of opportunities and circumvent obstacles.  
 
Changing Policy Trends under the PT 
When Lula became Brazil’s President in 2003, a wave of enthusiasm swept 
through social movements and policy communities on the Left. The PT had been created 
in 1980 by radical labor unionists, unorthodox leftists, and social movements struggling 
against the dictatorship that ended in the mid-1980s. During the 1990s, the party had 
gained fame for participatory policies at the local level. Upon Lula´s election, many 
social movement activists went to work for the government, seeking to implement their 
proposals and to strengthen participatory institutions (D´Araújo, 2009; Abers, Serafim e 
Tatagiba, 2014). The MMA was no exception. Lula´s first environment minister, Senator 
Marina Silva, represented a state in the Amazon region and was a close ally of the NGO 
community working for forest protection. She put many movement leaders in key 
positions within the MMA (Losekann, 2007; Abers and Oliveira, 2015; Oliveira, 2016).  
Yet, as many social movements soon found out, the PT era was much more than 
an opportunity for social movements to influence decision-making. Two tendencies 
marking the PT governments had effects that would be particularly relevant for 
understanding the case study presented here.  
In the first place, during the PT period, accountability agencies gained even more 
power and autonomy than they had before. Since the 1970s, Brazil´s Public Ministry (MP 
for Ministério Público), responsible for suing government in breaches of the public 
interest, gained increasing autonomy and power (Arantes, 2002). When in the opposition, 
the PT had seen the MP who had helped it fight against the government4 and the struggle 
against corruption and patronage had been central to PT efforts in local government. Lula 
and his successor, Dilma Rousseff, therefore sought to give the agency more autonomy, 
for example by enacting a policy of nominate agency heads chosen by the prosecutors 
themselves. The strengthening of the MP had innumerable effects, most notably 
increasing its capacity to investigate corruption, a factor that eventually contributed 
greatly to investigations that resulted in Rousseff´s impeachment (Arantes, 2015).  
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It also had an affect on the bureaucracy. When the PT took office, agencies 
responsible for social, health and environmental policy were almost entirely staffed by 
temporary employees hired without clear meritocratic requirements. The MP negotiated 
an agreement with the Lula administration to create a more stable, meritocratic hiring 
system. This process, combined with a broader expansion of the federal government, led 
to the elimination of temporary positions in several ministries and to the creation of 
188,000 new civil service jobs throughout the government, an increase of 38% (Escola 
Nacional de Administração Pública, 2015).  
These processes had major impact on the MMA, which had been populated since 
its creation in the 1990s largely by consultants. In 2005, these jobs were replaced by 
temporary positions filled through a meritocratic exam. It was a transition process that 
allowed significant numbers to remain in their jobs, as long as they could pass. After 
2008, the government created over 2,000 permanent, exam-based positions that replaced 
the temporary ones. Some people were able to stay on, but many more newcomers 
arrived.  
A second general tendency during the PT years was the creation of a new 
paradigm for social policy based on cash transfers. Lula´s flagship social policy was the 
Programa Bolsa Família (Family Grant Program), a cash transfer program that helped 
lift millions of Brazil´s poorest families out of extreme poverty. His administration 
created the Ministry of Social Development (MDS), a highly professionalized 
bureaucracy that distanced itself from the clientelist traditions of social policy in Brazil. 
Social movements had little say in the development of this policy or in this Ministry.  
The MDS created a sophisticated technology for identifying poor people and 
getting money to them. This involved the creation of a huge beneficiary database, the 
CadÚnico (for Cadastro Único, or unified registry). By 2010, the Bolsa Família was the 
largest cash transfer program in the world, attending about 12 million families. Recipient 
families received from about US$ 22 (R$77) to about US$ 97 (R$336) a month,5 
depending on the level of poverty and the number of school-age children (Bichir, 2012; 
Paiva, et al., 2013). It became the hallmark policy of the PT federal government.  
Upon taking office in 2011, Dilma Rousseff announced top priority for the Plano 
Brasil Sem Miséria (Brazil Without Misery Plan), a concentrated effort to eliminate 
extreme poverty once and for all. This involved increasing grants to the poorest families, 
instituting an “active search” for those who not yet made it to the rolls, and promoting a 
variety of other initiatives. Under the MDS´s command, agencies throughout the 
government implemented Brasil Sem Miséria programs. These included technical 
training courses; support for small farmers; and the expansion of basic services such as 
electricity, daycare, full time education, and housing. The Green Grants program would 
be the MMA´s contribution to this effort.  
This was the first time that a major MMA program had been designed without the 
participation of environmental movements. Close relations between non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and the MMA had existed since that agency´s creation as a 
secretariat in 1973 and later as a ministry in 1992. Until the 2000s, with few permanent 
employees, the agency had relied on the knowledge and capacity of non-governmental 
environmentalist organizations to design and implement policies (Hochstetler and Keck, 
2007). Under Minister Marina Silva, ties to NGOs intensified, as many went to work 
inside the administration. However, in 2008, halfway through Lula´s second term, Silva 
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broke with the PT, and in 2010 competed with Rousseff for the Presidency (Oliveira, 
2016).  
During the first Rousseff term (2011 – 2014), the relationship with 
environmentalist movements changed. Minister Isabela Teixeira was a technocrat with 
close ties to Rousseff. The showcase role of Green Grants under Teixeira suggested that 
environmental policy had become a supporting actor to the administration’s main 
protagonist, the effort to eliminate extreme poverty. If tensions between 
environmentalists and the government had contributed to Marina Silva’s exit while Lula 
was President, these intensified under Rousseff, as the government invested in big 
infrastructure, such as the Belo Monte dam, despite devastating environmental impacts 
(McCormick, 2011; Hochstetler and Montero, 2013; Abers, Oliveira and Pereira, 2016). 
People connected to the NGO community slowly left the ministry because they followed 
Silva, because they disagreed with ministry policies, or because they felt that the new 
administration was pushing them out (Interviews 1-8, 2013). Abers and Oliveira (2015) 
show that over the course of the decade after 2003, the number of upper and middle-
upper echelon appointees in the ministry with connections to social movements or NGOs 
slowly declined. They were largely replaced by permanent public servants.  
In sum, the Ministry of Environment, historically dominated by activists from the 
environmental community, had become a professionalized bureaucracy, almost entirely 
under the command of civil service bureaucrats. One of its top priority policies was about 
eliminating poverty, with less emphasis on environmental protection. This situation to a 
certain extent reflected the broader spirit of the first Rousseff administration: more 
technocratic, less influenced by social movement demands, with a clear priority to 
combating poverty. What is surprising is that the bureaucrats who ran antipoverty 
programs within the MMA advocated for the environmental cause, a fact that put them in 
conflict with a Minister whose main concern in the implementation of the Green Grants 
program was putting as many people on the cash transfer rolls as possible.  
 
The Cause: Socio-environmentalism 
 In a meeting early on in the first Rousseff term, a commission responsible for 
designing the Brasil Sem Miséria plan asked MMA officials to identify the social group 
with which the ministry that was most likely to live in extreme poverty. The answer was 
obvious: “traditional peoples and communities” (Interview 18). The term referred to local 
rural communities with roots in particular places and certain kinds of productive 
practices. Of particular interest were the so-called “extractivists:” communities dependent 
on the sustainable collection of products such as brazil nuts, fruits and rubber to be found 
in the native forest. Brazil’s rubber tappers poignantly embodied this concept. When 
land-grabbers seeking to expand ranching in the Amazon tried to expel them from their 
lands in the 1980s, an international movement grew up to support their movement, 
intensified by the assassination of their leader, Chico Mendes. in 1988 (Hochstetler and 
Keck, 2007; Keck, 1995).  
Through these experiences, the MMA began to develop a particular agency 
culture, that was largely dominated by what is known in Brazil as “socio-
environmentalism” (Interview 1; Hochstetler and Keck, 2007). This approach opposes 
itself to so-called “conservationist” traditions that focused on top-down regulations and 
the creation of protected areas untouched by human activities. Instead, socio-
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environmentalism proposes that environmental protection requires co-existence with 
human communities. In the 1990s, most MMA programs were influenced by socio-
environmentalist ideas. One focus was the creation of “extractivist reserves,” 
conservation units to protect economic activities, such as rubber tapping, that rely on 
sustainable resource use. The ministry also had programs for promoting sustainable 
farming practices adapted to the Amazon, such as agroforestry systems. The common 
thread was the idea that communities themselves should participate in policymaking at all 
levels (Abers, 2000). By the late 1990s, Amazonian social movements and NGO leaders 
began to speak of the forest protection work conducted by these populations as 
“environmental services,” although policy efforts in this direction were timid. Under 
Marina Silva, for example, a program designed in close collaboration with Amazonian 
organizations included a fund that would pay rural families for environmental services. 
The program, however, failed to get off the ground (Mattos, 2010) as did most programs 
that worked with traditional populations (Interview 1). Although considered by many to 
be a sort of headquarters for policies targeting these groups (Interviews 6, 8, 9 and 25), 
programs for them had a hard time gaining higher level political traction. The socio-
environmental project thus had a sort of “embattled” character to it, with the ministry in 
opposition to the central government.  
 
The Green Grants Program 
The Green Grants program provided families living in extreme poverty whose 
economic activities contributed to protecting standing forests with a bonus of 100 
Brazilian reais monthly (USD $29) in addition to their regular cash transfer. The 
government initially proposed a target of 73,000 beneficiary families by mid-2012, but 
soon moved the deadline to December, 2014, the end of Rousseff´s first term. It would be 
the first MMA program benefitting traditional peoples to be considered a presidential 
priority. 
Three groups were eligible for receiving the grants. First, the program included 
the residents of extractivist reserves. The Chico Mendes Institute for Biodiversity 
Conservation (ICMBIO) -- an agency subordinated to the MMA that manages Brazil 
national protected areas-- administers 59 Extractivist Reserves almost entirely in the 
Amazon region (ICMBIO, 2014). By September 2014, about 22,000 families living in 
these areas were receiving Green Grants (MMA, 2014).  
Second, the program targeted land reform settlements administered by the 
National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform (INCRA). That agency´s Green 
Settlements program had already mapped 74 settlements with high levels of poverty and 
particularly low levels of deforestation. These would be among the first areas included in 
the program (Interview 22). Land reform beneficiaries became the largest contingent of 
Green Grant recipients, about 41,000 families in September, 2014 (MMA, 2014) 
Third, the Secretariat of National Patrimony in the Ministry of Planning 
administered floodlands in the Amazon – considered federal patrimony because all 
waterways in Brazil are public domain. It had a program to guarantee usufruct rights to 
traditional fishing populations living in those territories. This group accounted for about 
5,900 of the program´s families by September, 2014 (MMA, 2014).  
Implementation through so many agencies, each with their own methods for 
defining potential beneficiaries, was a complicated task, as suggested by Figure 1. 
 10 
 
Reaching people living in such distant regions was also daunting. To receive a Green 
Grant, families had to jump through a series of hoops. First, they had to live in one of the 
protected areas or settlements prioritized by the program (represented by the squiggly 
shapes in Figure 1). A satellite study had to demonstrate that the area had adequate forest 
coverage. Second, the families had to be officially recognized residents of those areas. 
That required being on a list of one of the implementing agencies, whose understaffed 
field offices often had great difficulty monitoring the populations in their territories. 
Third, they had to be recipients of Bolsa Família. This required being included in the 
CadÚnico registry run by the Ministry of Social Development. Municipal governments 
whose offices were often located hundreds of kilometers from the protected areas or 
settlements where the families resided were responsible for including families in this list. 
In the poorest parts of Brazil, these governments were also likely to be sparsely staffed 
and underfunded. Fourth, the family had to be classified in the “extreme poverty” 
category. This depended only on the “self-declaration” of the household head. Finally, 
the household head had to sign a formal document that outlined program rules and 
regulations. This required that an official visit the family, explain the policy and get a 
signature. This could mean days of boat travel by field workers to homes in the most 






Figure 1: Organizational Chart of the Green Grant Program  
 





Opportunities and obstacles: The Work of Green Grants Bureaucrats  
 In order to understand how bureaucrats act, it is important to identify how their 
working conditions provide obstacles and opportunities for action. The focus here will be 
on the middle level workers located in Brasília who designed program details in 
negotiation with superiors and who coordinated field personnel. The Brazilian federal 
government classifies appointees into seven levels, with Ministers at the seventh level. Of 
the seventeen Green Grants bureaucrats interviewed, three had level five appointments 
(that is, two steps below the minister), six had level four appointments, one had a level 
three appointment. All but one of these appointees were permanents bureaucrats. Six 
were public servants without political appointments, and one had been hired on a 
temporary contract.  
In the MMA, the sector responsible for Green Grants had five technical 
employees called “environmental analysts” - and a few interns, supervised by a level four 
appointee. During the research period, three different civil servants occupied this 
coordinating post (all of whom were interviewed). In the Ministry of Social 
Development, three workers were closely involved in the program: a level five appointee 
responsible for rural social programs; a level four appointee who worked with databases; 
and an assistant. No employee was exclusively dedicated to the Green Grants program. 
These bureaucrats were in constant contact with the MMA staff.   
The three agencies responsible for implementation had offices in Brasilia, where 
officials coordinated the work of field personnel. A level five appointee at ICMBIO ran 
the department for “Socio-Environmental Programs and Territorial Consolidation.” 
Under him, a level four appointee was responsible for programs involving traditional 
populations. A level three appointee was the only person exclusively responsible for 
Green Grants. She described her job as almost entirely dedicated to organizing the flow 
of information between the agency´s central offices and the protected areas where 
beneficiaries lived. At INCRA, Green Grants was one of several programs in the General 
Coordination for the Environment– not even the most important one, according to the 
coordinator, a level four appointee. Under him, only two administrative employees 
helped with the program. The smaller program at the SPU was run by a level four 
employee, working alone on Green Grants and other activities.  
The employees at the MMA and of the Ministry of Social Development designed 
and coordinated the program in close collaboration. The Steering Committee that 
officially governed the program only began to meet regularly in 2013. Before then, key 
decisions were hashed out in “Situation Rooms:” high priority meetings charged with 
finding solutions to implementation problems. A major modus operandi of the Rousseff 
administration, the personnel at Social Development were experts at putting pressure on 
the agencies they worked with through these meetings. The Green Grants team at the 
MMA worked hard to prepare for them and middle echelon personnel negotiated directly 
to defend the proposals they designed. 
It was through these arenas as well as informal conversations between technical 
personnel and middle managers, and between middle and upper level managers, that the 
actors defined strategies for reaching beneficiaries. There was plenty of funding. Indeed, 
as one bureaucrat told me: “A priori, in the Brasil Sem Miséria Program, we do not have 
budgetary problems” (Interview 18). Yet lower level personnel spoke bitterly about how 
difficult it was to dig themselves out of the pile of paperwork. This was especially true 
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for those in the three implementing agencies.  
“There isn’t enough time to think! Because imagine, we have to answer the field 
manager, who calls us up saying ‘please, there are two people here who did not 
receive the grant’. We have to send this to the MMA, to say, ‘please MMA solve 
this problem’! Then another field manager that says, ‘I sent in 300 names and 
only some of them received the grant’, and we have to investigate who did and 
who didn’t, and we can’t come up with an explanation. So, we have to talk to the 
MMA and the MMA sends the information back to us and we send it back to the 
unit. We´ve become an information desk! A sort of hotline!” (Interview 16).  
Several noted that they felt obliged to resist constant pressure from the 
coordinating agencies to increase the numbers. “The MMA has the role of designing the 
policy and to make demands on us, and we try to put on the brakes,” (Interview 22). For 
one it was not so much his lack of influence in the decision-making structure, but a 
broader structural limitation:  
“There is plenty of space in this program to say what we think should happen. I 
think that this is because the program is coordinated by the MMA, which is very 
open to that. But the government …. does not have the technical and operational 
capacity to implement a program of this kind!” (Interview 21).  
In sum, three characteristics of work in the Green Grants program combined to 
influence what bureaucrats seeking to promote environmentalism could do. First, they 
were under tremendous pressure to increase the number of program beneficiaries, almost 
at all costs. Second, the fact that the program had high priority meant that there were 
more resources available related to this program than was common for environmental 
policies. Third, program coordinators adopted participatory procedures, allowing 
technical personal to present their opinions and debate policy design. This is the context 
in which the bureaucrats I interviewed sought out opportunities for change.  
 
Contentious ideas 
As suggested earlier, a first step to identifying whether bureaucrats are activists is 
to find out what ideas they defend, if any. Of the seventeen Green Grants employees 
interviewed, only four did not express clear environmentalist commitments. Three were 
Ministry of Social Development staff. Although they recognized the importance of 
protecting the environment, they were clearly more interested in bringing cash transfers 
to remote populations. The other was an MMA “environmental analyst” who, despite 
having similar qualifications and formal status as other interviewees, saw herself as 
primarily an administrator.  
The remainder described their work as part of a longer life story in which they 
had developed commitments to environmental causes through different kinds of social 
experiences. Importantly for our proposition that activism does not require membership 
in social movements organizations, these commitments did not necessarily grow out of 
participation in civil society networks. Six interviewees had prior experience in social 
movement organizations or NGOs: one had fought for the creation of a protected area in 
his home region; another had been a lawyer for land reform activists; another had worked 
with indigenous groups, and so on. The majority, however, said that their interest in 
environmentalism emerged in college or graduate school, largely because they studied 
fields such as biology or environmental management. In general, like Kaufmann´s (1960) 
 13 
 
forest rangers, considerable self-selection was at work.  
Although interviewees rarely spoke specifically about how their notions of 
environmentalism changed after working in government, the ideas they defended clearly 
resonated with the socio-environmental approach dominant in the Ministry. In fact, the 
only interviewee who presented a more “conservationist” perspective worked for the 
Planning Ministry. He strongly defended the importance of strict monitoring of 
deforestation. The employees at the MMA, ICMBIO and the land agency, INCRA, were 
more clearly concerned with empowering local communities as part of the 
environmentalist project. They praised the program for bringing cash transfers to hitherto 
invisible social groups that their agencies had long defended. Yet they also viewed cash 
transfers to a portion of families as a far cry from the community-based approaches that 
socioenvironmentalism called for. For some, the effort to meet the ambitious target 
distracted resources from activities that would guarantee that families actually understood 
their commitments and had the means to fulfill them. This would require more 
investment in training and technical assistance. For others, just sending money to these 
families was not enough: without better access to social policies, they tended to abandon 
their sustainable lifestyles. Finally, many wondered if restricting the program to people in 
extreme poverty was fruitful. By supporting one neighbor and passing over others, the 
program created tensions in local communities and a sense of injustice. One suggested 
that by privileging the very poor, the policy might even be counterproductive, since it 
excluded families who were more successful at sustainable economic production 
(Interview 17).  
In sum, most of the workers interviewed held strong beliefs about the need to 
change policy priorities. These ideas can be understood as of the “cause” variety, since 
they were defended in terms of an opposition to strong adversaries, in this case a 
government that prioritized economic development and poverty reduction over not just 
environmentalism, but to a socio-environmental approach.  
 
Taking Advantage of Opportunities 
As discussed earlier, activism involves not just action around causes, but a 
particular mode of action: the proactive pursuit of opportunities. In the following sections 
I hope to show that the bureaucrats studied actively sought to change policy in favor of 
the socio-environmental cause. One important initiative was a training program for 
beneficiaries. A staff member at the MMA worked with a friend at the British Embassy to 
obtain support for the Green Grants program (Interview 23). The result was an effort that 
took place entirely outside the government, though designed by middle level bureaucrats 
at the MMA. The embassy provided funding to an NGO specialized in training courses 
for traditional communities, which embarked on a two-year program that taught field 
personnel and municipal employees to be Green Grants instructors. The initiative can be 
understood as an effort by MMA employees to put the program to the service of the long-
standing “traditional communities” agenda.   
Another major step forward, according to several interviewees was a rural 
technical assistance program specifically for Green Grants recipients. This effort 
involved drawing on an already existing program run by the Ministry of Agrarian 
Development that funded a competitive grant program for agronomists and other 
professionals to assist small farmers. In 2014, bureaucrats from the Ministries of Agrarian 
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Development, Social Development and the Environment helped design the first 
competition directed toward providing technical assistance for extractivists (interviews 
22 and 23). According to INCRA official responsible for Green Grants, this rural 
assistance initiative was much more important than the program itself. After a long career 
fighting deforestation in land reform settlements, this bureaucrat saws the technical 
assistance program as key to supporting that cause.  
Interviewees at ICMBIO told me how they convinced the Ministry of Social 
Development to allocate funds from Brasil Sem Miseira to pay for a broad-based study of 
households living in extractivist reserves. Conducting such a study had always been on 
ICMBIO´s agenda, but had never moved forward. The study, one interviewee said, would 
help ICMBIO better design policy and programs for those families, above and beyond the 
cash transfer program. The idea became a pet project of the program director at ICMBIO, 
who threw himself into negotiating with the Ministry of Social Development to fund it. 
The money allowed ICMBIO to hire a university team to organize a much more 
systematic household study than the agency had been able to conduct on its own 
(Interviews 16 and 17).  
These ideas had three things in common. First, they sought to go beyond the 
“quantitative” component of the program. Training courses, technical assistance and a 
detailed study of extractivist families would allow for the program to reach deeper into 
the lives of beneficiaries, not only providing cash, but also building capacities for 
environmentally sustainable production and access to a broader range of government 
programs. They thus pushed the program toward the socio-environmentalist agenda.  
Second, they creatively interconnected actors and organizations in new ways. The 
program allowed bureaucrats to mobilize resources from one government agency to help 
another (such as Brasil Sem Miséria funding for technical assistance and a household 
survey). They also made connections outside the government, such as between an 
embassy and an NGO. These initiatives were not individual activities, but rather 
collective actions.  
Third, they not only sought to improve Green Grants, but also other programs 
implemented by the agencies involved. As one interviewee noted: “We started to see 
Green Grants as a policy that induces other policies.” (Interview 22). Funding for 
technical assistance for extractivists supported a broader effort by the INCRA staffer to 
create “sustainable settlements.” The study of extractivist households would provide 
information to support other ICMBIO policies. Many of the people I interviewed seem to 
invest in Green Grants because they saw it as a way to leverage resources toward other 
projects and programs they worked on. In this sense, actors not only sought to find 
opportunities to make Green Grants greener, they also saw the program itself as an 
opportunity to strengthen other environmental programs to which they were more deeply 
committed. Their activism around the Green Grants program was motivated by 
commitments built over longer professional and organizational histories.  
 
Dealing with changing opportunities 
The bureaucrats interviewed not only worked to transform program design in 
ways that promoted their own ideas about what government should be doing, they also 
sought to guarantee those changes over time. The need to do so became clear in late 
2014, when extremely close elections first put the continuity of the Rousseff presidency 
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in doubt. I conducted a second round of interviews in October 2014, just before runoff 
elections for president that many thought her adversary would win (He did not).  
Uncertain of the policy´s future, an MMA interviewee told me that the staff was 
working hard on two fronts. First, they wanted to meet the target of 73,000. “It is a 
question of honor for us. The staff need to be able to say that they did it” (Interview 23). 
Second, the staff was “trying to leave its mark”. Even if the current president leaves, she 
noted, the new government will need quickly to put together a four-year budget plan and 
hopefully Green Grants would be in it. The group was engaged in collectively writing a 
report summarizing lessons learned and recommending changes. They wanted to simplify 
the process of registering beneficiaries. This would shore up resources that could be 
going to the training and technical assistance efforts. They also proposed increasing the 
beneficiary public to include anyone under the poverty line, and not just extreme poverty, 
so that entire communities could be included. Another project was to design a larger 
training program for extractivists. Their concern was to get this document written and 
approved by higher-ups before end of the government, to give it some legitimacy.  
A year later, I conducted a few more interviews, to see what happened. Rousseff 
had narrowly won the election and initiated a new term in 2015, making no major 
changes in the Ministry. At the time of these interviews most people (incorrectly) 
presumed the new government would survive Rousseff´s second four-year term. Brazil 
was in deep recession and funding was short. A new Secretary of Extractivism and 
Sustainable Rural Development told me that the priority was now improving program 
quality rather than continued quantitative increases. This included many of the initiatives 
cited earlier. Both the technical assistance project and the training program were in 
development and the ICMBIO household study was complete. The technical report had 
never been signed by the upper echelon, but it did inform the new leadership of the 
program, hired over the course of 2015 (Interviews 24, 25 and 26). In sum, it would seem 
that by reducing pressure to expand the program, the fiscal crisis created room for the 
activists´ proposals to flourish.  
These advances occurred despite a major turnover in the Green Grant staff at the 
MMA. Almost everyone I had interviewed left the program in early 2015, after a series of 
conflicts. According to two interviewees from the original team (who I interviewed for a 
second time later that year), problems began after a change in coordination. Soon after 
the original coordinator left, the program´s Steering Committee made a draconian 
decision to summarily remove families from the rolls if satellite images showed 
deforestation in their lands. The proposal went uncontested because staff members were, 
for the first time, not allowed to participate in the meeting (Interview 24). One of the 
people who left the program told me that the new coordinator was uninterested in hearing 
out more experienced employees, for example refusing to take into consideration a study 
she had written. She expressed deep anger and frustration at what she interpreted as 
disrespect for her qualifications (Interview 27).  
The unpopular coordinator, however, did not last long. A new Secretary took over 
and brought in a person who had worked closely with rubber tappers organizations. 
According to the new coordinator, those organizations were enthusiastic about getting 
more involved in the program now that its focus would be less on increasing numbers and 
more on improving capacities. Yet by then, most of the people who had helped build the 
program had moved on. The story as we leave it, thus ends on a dubious note. On the one 
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hand, the program was looking more and more like a socio-environmental program, with 
a focus not just on cash transfers, but on empowering extractivists and small farmer 
communities to protect forests. On the other hand, many of those who had defended those 
proposals had left. Those I was able to speak to told me that they did so, largely because 




Although by the time of this writing, Rousseff´s government had collapsed under 
the weight of, among other problems, a huge corruption scandal, it would be a grave 
mistake to understand the PTs approach to governing as nothing but pork barrel politics. 
At the same time that the government adopted such traditional practices in some realms, 
it also invested in building a more professional bureaucracy. The Ministry of 
Environment was one of the agencies most clearly affected by this professionalization 
process. This article suggests, however, that in the environmental sector, 
professionalization did not produce a prototypical, rule-following technocracy. Instead, 
most of the bureaucrats interviewed expressed commitments to socio-environmental 
causes and acted upon those commitments in ways that sometimes contradicted the 
demands of their superiors. Understanding the dynamics of the Green Grants program is 
difficult without conceiving the government agencies involved as populated by activists. 
The concept of activism proposed in this article evokes both a kind of idea – the 
defense of contentious causes against perceived powerful forces – and a kind of action -- 
the proactive pursuit of opportunities to promote those causes. The Green Grants 
bureaucrats rarely transgressed rules explicitly, but they did press against and work 
around them. As one put it, he felt a duty to apply the brakes on pressure from above to 
increase the numbers without consideration for environmental effects. Bureaucrats also 
attempted to circumvent that pressure, finding resources and support for initiatives that 
would make the program “greener.” Getting these activities off the ground required 
mobilization, alliance building and networking. Their strategies were not necessarily 
subversive (Olsson, 2015): they often involved taking advantage of a sympathetic ear, or 
a chance to participate in a strategic meeting. Such acts can be understood as contentious, 
however, in the sense that they required questioning authority and challenging the limits 
posed by budget allocations and formal responsibilities. Working around the rules might 
even mean mobilizing resources outside the state, as when the MMA team got the British 
Embassy to finance a project to be implemented by an NGO.  
If the activist bureaucrats studied sought out opportunities to adapt the program to 
socio-environmentalist ideas, they also envisioned the program itself as an opportunity to 
defend other projects they had defended for much longer. Various interviewees saw the 
program´s priority status as part of Brasil Sem Miseria as an opportunity for promoting 
issues of their concern: technical assistance for extractivists, research on extractivist 
reserve families, and so on.  
Actors pursuing causes strategically seek out and mobilize resources made 
available or allies made powerful by broader political processes. Activist public servants 
may also do this by transferring to subdivisions where they feel they can make a 
contribution, or where political shifts have put people in charge who share their beliefs. 
This idea was suggested by one interviewee who specifically referred to herself as an 
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activist. “The day I feel that I am not being useful, I will want to change areas (Interview 
11).” Following through, a year later she was among those who changed sectors within 
the Ministry in frustration, when leadership change left the Green Grants staff feeling 
undervalued. Activist bureaucrats look for positions in policies that promote causes in 
which they believe and that are managed in a way that allows for their input. For many 
involved in the Green Grants program, frustration with the program´s initial focus 
seemed to be compensated by the fact that they had influence over its evolving design. 
The belief that a participatory management structure no longer existed led them to look 
for other opportunities to work for the causes they believed in.  
It is difficult within the purview of this study to establish precisely how much 
impact they actually had. In follow-up interviews in 2016, I found that most of the 
initiatives they had designed were still underway, and that the general spirit they 
proposed of promoting a more qualitative, community empowerment approach, had been 
adopted by the new leadership. At the same time, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff 
and economic crisis caused a major rupture in the policy process. Whether or not the 
activist proposals – or the program as a whole – will survive this rupture is an open 
question.  
The findings of this study have been corroborated by a growing body of research 
in Brazil on activism inside bureaucracies. Various studies have examined how, during 
the PT era, activists moved from civil society into government jobs, such as feminists in 
the Ministry of Health (Abers and Tatagiba, 2015), urban reform activists in the Ministry 
of Cities (Serafim, 2013), and the employees of a federal department created by Lula 
explicitly for promoting government relations with movements (Cayres, 2015). But other 
researchers have found activism operating inside political institutions by actors who did 
not come from movement backgrounds before joining government. Important policy 
reforms in Brazil (such as in health and social welfare) were the work of technical-
professional movements operating largely inside the state and political parties (Faletti, 
2006; Dowbor, 2012; Gutierres, 2015). Very recent research on Brazil by Brandão 
(2017), Brandão and Vilaça (2017), Brandão and Viana (2016) and Viana (2017), have 
described activist behavior among public employees in the areas of solid waste 
management and housing policy and among public prosecutors, many of whom built their 
commitment to activist causes through their work in government.  
These works suggest that the proactive defense of contentious causes by 
bureaucrats may be a common practice, especially in public agencies created to promote 
social and environmental justice. This does not mean that all bureaucrats are activists. By 
focusing on the nature of the ideas activists defend and the forms of action they engage 
in, our purpose here less to generalize than to create a lens through which activism inside 
the bureaucracy can be recognized and made visible.  
Highlighting activism in the bureaucracy contributes to the broader debate on the 
nature of agency within organizations. By showing that middle level actors can have 
incremental influence on policy design, the notion of activist bureaucrats is consistent 
with the idea that transformative agency should not be restricted to the work of heroic 
“institutional entrepreneurs” who somehow break rules that everyone else takes for 
granted (Clegg, 2010; Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca, 2011; Berk and Galvan 2013). 
Rather than escaping the constraints of institutions and hierarchy, activist bureaucrats 
develop beliefs through life experiences, networks and the organizations in which they 
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work. Their causes are collectively construed, rather than simply individual preferences. 
Their efforts to defend them, however, do are not simply a matter of conforming. Instead, 
they struggle on a daily basis to discover institutional opportunities and vulnerabilities, to 
work around rules and to find the time to organize with each other in defense of ideas 
they believe in. The result may not be revolutionary, but it may be much more relevant 
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